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Consider the following facts. Entrepreneurs tend to start their businesses in the regions
in which they have deep roots, the places where they have family and friends, their “home”
regions (e.g. Katona and Morgan 1952; Mueller and Morgan 1962). They are even more
biased toward remaining in these places than employees (Michelacci and Silva 2007; Dahl
and Sorenson 2009). Yet, home regions often offer less favorable economic environments for
their startups than other possible places (Sorenson and Audia 2000; Figueiredo et al. 2002).
Together, these facts pose a puzzle: Entrepreneurs, who have much to gain or lose from their
location choices, remain rooted in their home regions, even when more favorable conditions
exist elsewhere.
One possible resolution to this puzzle is that entrepreneurs choose the places that they
do, not so much to maximize the performance of their ventures, but rather to allow them
to spend more time with family and friends (Gimeno et al. 1997; Dahl and Sorenson 2009).
Entrepreneurs would then exhibit a preference for home regions because those places have
the highest concentrations of loved ones.
Another is that the attractiveness of locations differs across entrepreneurs, even within
the same industry. Those with deep roots in a region possess local information and connec-
tions of potential value to their ventures. Entrepreneurs therefore may thrive in their home
regions, even if those places appear unattractive to others—for example, because of intense
competition. For the founder, the question is not, where would some hypothetical entrant
do best, but rather where, given my resources, do I have the greatest odds of success.
Though either of these explanations could account for entrepreneurs’ preferences for home
regions, they differ in their predictions for performance: If entrepreneurs choose locations
to remain close to family and friends, then one might expect living near loved ones to act
as a compensating differential—entrepreneurs might gladly accept lesser financial rewards in
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exchange for these social benefits. If, however, locating in home regions allows entrepreneurs
to exploit their knowledge and connections, then deep roots in the region should have a
positive effect on performance.
To gain greater traction on the relative importance of these factors and to assess the
rather practical question of how entrepreneurs’ choices of locations influence the perfor-
mance of their ventures, we explore data from Denmark. The Danish data provide extensive
information on both the attachment of individuals to regions and on multiple dimensions of
the performance of startups, including their survival and profitability.
We operationalize regional attachment in terms of the number of years that an en-
trepreneur has lived in a region, prior to founding his or her firm. Those with longer tenure
in a region have businesses that survive longer and that generate greater annual profits.
Relative to a newcomer, an entrepreneur with average tenure in a region (6.4 years) has a
9% lower rate of exit and earns roughly $8,172 more in annual profits.1 By comparison,
relative to a de novo entrant, an entrepreneur with average experience in the industry (or
in a related industry) has an 11% (5%) lower rate of exit and earns $3,508 ($2,374) more in
annual profits. These results, moreover, are relatively robust to the use of an instrumental
variable – the number of years that the entrepreneur’s parents lived in a region – to correct
for possible endogeneity in the choice of location.
Our results have implications for a number of literatures. Most directly, with respect to
the research on entrepreneurship, they imply that – even if entrepreneurs choose to remain
in their home regions for other reasons – their better understanding of and social connections
within these regions mean that their ventures typically do best in these places. But they
also speak to two other somewhat-related streams of research. In international business, a
1We calculated all dollar values by converting from Danish kroner using the January 1, 2009, exchange
rate of 5.5 kroner to the US dollar.
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number of studies have found that firms suffer a liability of foreignness when they expand
into new countries (Cuervo-Cazurra et al. 2007). Foreign companies face import restrictions,
transportation costs, and unfamiliarity with the laws, language, customs and preferences
of the local population. Our results demonstrate that this disadvantage of not being from
a region extends to the individual level, that it can occur even in the absence of legal,
linguistic or cultural barriers, and that it exists at much finer geographic scales than the
crossing of national boundaries. Meanwhile, a literature at the intersection of franchising
and organizational learning has noted that chains perform better when they open units in
regions in which they have prior operating experience (Ingram and Baum 1997; Kalnins and
Mayer 2004). This fact has generally been attributed to the ability of these chains to develop
effective operational routines through learning-by-doing and then to transfer those routines
across their units. Our results suggest that chains may also benefit from the non-operating
experience of their owners and managers in the region, as this local embeddedness may allow
them to spot opportunities and to build connections that facilitate hiring.
1 Regional embeddedness
Regional embeddedness captures multiple dimensions of the relationship between an indi-
vidual and a place. In part it suggests understanding. The person knows more about the
history of a region, the culture of a region and a large share of other factors that would be
difficult for an outsider to assess. In part it reflects relationships. The embedded individual
has friends and family in a region that attach him or her to it.
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1.1 Compensating differentials
One possible consequence of this regional embeddedness is that entrepreneurs forgo opportu-
nities for higher profit elsewhere. Because they derive satisfaction from spending time with
family and friends, they may garner greater overall utility from living and working in a place
that facilitates these interactions than in one that optimizes expected income.
Several lines of research appear to support this idea. Studies of the returns to en-
trepreneurship, for example, typically find that entrepreneurs could earn more as employees
(Evans and Leighton 1989; Hamilton 2000). Entrepreneurs, therefore, appear to found firms
not as a means of maximizing income but rather in the pursuit of non-pecuniary com-
pensations, such as satisfaction from the feelings of accomplishment and control that self-
employment offers, or from the ability to tailor their schedules to their avocations and social
activities. Indeed, despite their lower incomes, entrepreneurs consistently report greater job
satisfaction than wage earners (Blanchflower and Oswald 1998; Benz and Frey 2008).
Given that non-financial considerations influence entrepreneurs’ decisions to open their
own businesses, one might also expect them to influence the kinds of businesses pursued
and the places where entrepreneurs pursue them. Researchers, for example, have found
that entrepreneurs more commonly live in their regions of birth (Michelacci and Silva 2007).
But does this tendency reflect a preference for non-financial factors? More direct evidence
comes from Dahl and Sorenson (2009), who examined the correlates of location choice among
Danish entrepreneurs and employees. They found that entrepreneurs placed greater weight
than employees on living near family and friends. To the extent that entrepreneurs may then
place less weight on the expected success of their ventures, those weightings could induce a
negative relationship between regional embeddedness and performance (Gimeno et al. 1997).
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1.2 Opportunity identification
But regional embeddedness could also contribute positively to the performance of startups.
Prospective entrepreneurs must first notice an unmet need. Regional embeddedness can
foster this opportunity identification both through direct experience and through interactions
with others. A nascent entrepreneur living in the region, for example, might want a particular
product and, being unable to find it, decide to produce it himself. Or, he could become
aware of an opportunity from a friend. Regardless of the source, locals almost certainly have
a better sense of the economic opportunities around them. Moreover, once the initial idea
hits them, they can “test” the local market cheaply by talking about it with friends.
At least two lines of research support this idea. First, research on franchises has found
that chains perform better when they open units in places in which they have prior operating
experience (Ingram and Baum 1997; Kalnins and Mayer 2004). Some of this advantage may
stem from the greater ability to share organizational learning across proximate units, but
some of it probably also reflects a better ability to spot local opportunities and to choose
restaurant locations (Kalnins and Mayer 2004). To the extent that these benefits depend on
information on the local environment rather than on learning-by-doing, they should extend
even to locals that lack prior experience in the industry.
Second, the literature on international business has identified a liability of foreignness—
companies that expand abroad appear disadvantaged relative to domestic competitors (Cuervo-
Cazurra et al. 2007). Several factors have been forwarded to explain this disadvantage,
including trade barriers, transportation costs and the need to optimize operations across
multiple markets. But researchers have also attributed this liability, in part, to the fact that
foreign companies do not know the local environment as well and therefore cannot match
their products and services to local demand as effectively as domestic competitors (e.g.,
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Zaheer 1995). To the degree that demand also varies within countries, entrepreneurs with
experience in a region may better match their offerings to local demand than outsiders.
1.3 Resource mobilization
Regionally-embedded entrepreneurs may also enjoy advantages in resource mobilization. Fol-
lowing the identification of an opportunity, entrepreneurs must assemble a variety of resources
to begin operations—financial capital and employees with the applicable abilities and rele-
vant experience.
Acquiring these resources is difficult. New firms lack track records. Investors and would-
be employees therefore have little on which to base their assessments of the expected success
of the venture. Moreover, they usually cannot place great confidence in the information
that they receive from the entrepreneurs themselves: To secure funding and employees, en-
trepreneurs have incentives to exaggerate their odds of success (Amit et al. 1990; Kosová and
Lafontaine 2010). And even impeccably honest entrepreneurs over-estimate their prospects
(Camerer and Lovallo 1999). Investors and in-demand employees therefore generally eschew
unproven ventures.
Social connections can nonetheless improve an entrepreneur’s odds of securing financing
and recruiting employees for at least three reasons. First, trusted third-parties that know
the entrepreneur can provide investors and prospective employees with more objective as-
sessments of the entrepreneurs’ abilities and chances of success (Sorenson and Stuart 2001).
Second, these shared relationships also provide a means of recourse should the entrepreneur
behave dishonestly (Raub and Weesie 1990; Greif 1993). They therefore increase the level
of rational trust that an investor or employee can place in the entrepreneur. But even in
the absence of such “impartial” information and rational trust, prior connections to the
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entrepreneur can encourage investment. Familiarity tends to bias individuals in their evalu-
ations of products and people (Zajonc 1968). As a result, potential investors and employees
probably consider entrepreneurs with whom they have had prior dealings of higher ability
and of greater reliability, thereby increasing their willingness to work with them (Sorenson
and Waguespack 2006).
Consistent with these ideas, research has repeatedly found that prior connections facili-
tate financing and recruiting. Family and friends are the most common sources of financial
capital for startups (Bygrave et al. 2003). Entrepreneurs with direct and indirect connections
to venture capitalists have the highest probability of securing financing from them (Shane and
Stuart 2002). And more than half of the early employees in startups are spouses, relatives
or former business associates of the founders (Ruef et al. 2003).
The relationships that help to facilitate this process of resource mobilization nevertheless
remain largely rooted in the regions in which entrepreneurs have lived and worked. Individ-
uals tend to form connections with those they meet in their day-to-day activities (Feld 1981;
Sorenson and Stuart 2001), and their likelihood of maintaining relationships, once formed,
declines with distance (Zipf 1949). Unlike human capital, which entrepreneurs carry with
them wherever they go, social capital depreciates as one transports it from the regions in
which it had been developed.
2 Empirical evidence
We examined the performance of Danish startups, conditional on the attributes of their
founders.2 Our data come from government registers collected in the Integrated Database for
2Though it should not influence the theoretical implications of our analysis, one might worry that Den-
mark differs in its level of entrepreneurship from other countries. Eurostat figures from 2004 (available
at: http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/statistics), however, indicate that, per
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Labor Market Research (referred to by its Danish acronym, IDA) and the Entrepreneurship
Database, both maintained by Statistics Denmark. IDA holds comprehensive, annually
updated, longitudinal data on all individuals residing in Denmark from 1980 to 2006. The
dataset also links individuals to annual information on their employers, such as the industry
classification of those firms. The Entrepreneurship Database meanwhile contains annual
information, including most importantly the identities of the primary founders, on new
firms in Denmark from 1995 to 2004.
Our sample consists of all new ventures with at least one employee in the first year
(15,884 cases), where we have information about the founder in both the founding year and
the preceding year (15,708). Statistics Denmark records founding at the firm level. Multiple
facilities owned by the same individual or shareholders – such as a factory with more than
one plant or a firm with several sales outlets – would therefore only count as a single founding
event. From this population, we excluded 2,010 start-ups in farming, fishing and mining,
and in the wholesale sector because we suspected that performance in those cases depends
primarily on the physical attributes of the region (and less on the founders’ attributes). We
also eliminated 532 cases with founders 55 years of age or older at the time of founding to
ensure that our exit variable did not include retirements. In total, we analyzed information
on 13,166 startups.
capita, Denmark has a similar number of new firms with at least one employee to other northern European
countries: .82 per 1000 for Denmark, .81 for Germany, .89 for the Netherlands. The United Kingdom and
United States, by contrast, report much higher rates of 3.76 and 2.05 per 1000, respectively (U.S. statistics
come from the Small Business Administration). Note, however, that the U.K. and the U.S. rates also include
firms with less than one full-time employee.
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2.1 Independent variables
Region tenure: Our primary interest concerns how entrepreneurs socially embedded in a
region perform relative to those less connected. To measure this attachment, we examined
entrepreneurs’ geographic histories. Denmark had 271 comprehensive and mutually exclusive
municipalities (“kommune” in Danish) over the course of our observation window.3 Our
measure counts the number of years, over the 15 years prior to entry, that each entrepreneur
lived in the municipality in which he or she opened her business.4,5 Table 1 lists the industries
most commonly entered and reports the average region tenure of the founders in each.
Alternatively, one might imagine trying to observe directly whether entrepreneurs had
close personal contacts in a region. Even if we had such information, however, we still see
reasons for focusing on region tenure instead. First, the opportunity identification advantage
of being embedded in a region involves knowledge that could come through observation rather
than interaction. Second, one must worry about the meaning of relationships. At issue is
the fact that people select into them. Differences in the quality or number of connections
available to individuals might therefore reflect individual-level heterogeneity rather than
random variation in their relationships (Manski 1993). Measuring these connections directly
raises a reflection problem that could bias the estimates.
Because our research design essentially compares businesses across entrepreneurs, we
3The municipality represents the most fine-grained geographic unit available to us. Each one encompasses
an average of 54 square miles of land (SD = 38). Models using more aggregated spatial units, such as the 79
labor market areas (see Andersen 2000), yielded similar, though somewhat smaller, estimates. The smaller
magnitude of effects using more aggregated units suggests that at least some of the benefits to regional
embeddedness accrue at a highly local level.
4One might expect the value of this experience to decay. In unreported models, we explored whether the
effects of region tenure fade with time and found some evidence that it does, but slowly. In the interest of
easy interpretation, we nonetheless report models in which tenure’s value does not decay.
5Although we have more than 15 years of information for many individuals, we restricted the window to
15 years so that any variation in years of residence would stem from differences in the time that entrepreneurs
had spent in the region rather than from variation in our ability to observe them (left-censoring). Models
using all of the available information nevertheless produced qualitatively identical results.
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included three classes of entrepreneur-level characteristics – experience, demographics and
financial resources – to ensure that compositional differences, across the entrepreneurs that
locate their businesses in home regions versus those that locate them elsewhere, do not drive
our results.
Industry experience: A number of studies suggest that entrepreneurs with prior experi-
ence in an industry perform better than those without it (e.g., Agarwal et al. 2004; Klepper
and Sleeper 2005; Dahl and Reichstein 2007). These spinoff entrepreneurs presumably have
more of the industry-specific knowledge necessary to run a business. Though some of this
knowledge appears in operational manuals and becomes built into machinery, much of it
remains tacit, incorporated in the unwritten routines that employees follow. Absorbing
these routines therefore requires intensive observation and involvement in the processes, and
usually stems from prior experience in an existing firm in the industry.
We measured this prior experience in two ways. (1) We counted the number of years, over
the 15 years prior to entry, that each entrepreneur worked in the same four-digit industry
as their current venture (industry exp). (2) We also summed the number of years, over that
same period, that an entrepreneur worked in a different four-digit, but the same two-digit,
industry as their current venture (related ind exp).
Demographics: Though we do not have strong priors on how they might influence en-
trepreneurial success, we included controls for gender, marital status, age and education.
Male takes a value of one for male entrepreneurs. Studies have frequently found a gender
gap in entrepreneurship, with businesses started by men performing better (for a review,
see Brush 1992). Married is an indicator variable where one represents married individuals.
Founder age records the age of the entrepreneur at the time of founding; we also included a
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quadratic term for age, as prior studies suggest that age has a non-monotonic relationship
with entrepreneurship (Hamilton 2000).
Many studies have also found positive associations between founder education and per-
formance, both in terms of the survival and earnings of their start-ups (for a review, see
Van der Sluis et al. 2008). Although most of these studies operationalize education in
terms of years of schooling, our exploration of the data suggested that the returns to educa-
tion occur in discrete steps in Denmark. We therefore coded education into three categories:
College-educated, Gymnasium- or vocational-school-educated, and those with less education.
Financial resources: Finally, we introduced controls for the financial resources available
to the entrepreneur. These resources could have either positive or negative effects. On the one
hand, they might allow entrepreneurs to pursue good ideas that they could not have followed
in the absence of these personal resources. On the other hand, they might simply permit the
pursual of bad ideas longer than an outside investor would. Prior research nevertheless has
generally found positive relationships between financial resources and performance (Brüderl
et al. 1992; Gimeno et al. 1997).
We measured these resources with three variables: Wage records the amount that the
entrepreneur earned in (hundreds of thousands of) Danish kroner in the year prior to found-
ing. Household wealth sums the aggregate assets available to the entrepreneur in (hundreds
of thousands of) Danish kroner in the year prior to founding. This measure includes both
liquid and illiquid assets, such as the value of a house, net of debt. Parent wealth sums the
assets owned by the entrepreneur’s parents and his or her spouse’s parents in the year prior
to founding (also in units of 100,000 Danish kroner). We inflated all of these values forward,
using a Danish consumer price index, to 2010 kroner. Table 2 reports descriptive statistics
for the variables used in the models.
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2.2 Failure rates
We began our assessment of firm performance with an analysis of exit rates. Exit here
indicates that the employer code ceased to exist, which could either represent a liquidation
or a sale of the business. To allow for the most flexible specification of the hazard rate, we
estimated a piece-wise exponential model with age pieces for every year of firm tenure (i.e.
1 year, 2 years...). Other than this firm age parameter, none of the other variables update
over time (i.e. they remain fixed for each case at their levels in the year of entry).
All of the models also included fixed effects for (i) entry year and (ii) region of entry.6 Our
data spans at least one full business cycle and the probability of failure undoubtedly varies
across this cycle. The regions, moreover, differ substantially on a variety of characteristics,
such as population density and proximity to ports, that may also influence performance.
Table 3 reports estimates of the predictors of firm exit as hazard ratios. Coefficients
less than one therefore represent factors associated with longer survival, better performance,
while those greater than one indicate factors associated with faster failure. Beginning with
model 1, each year of founder tenure in the region entered reduces the rate of exit by nearly
2%; since these start-ups have an expected survival of roughly four years, each year the
entrepreneur lived in the region increases the expected lifespan of the venture by about one
month (4 × 365 × .02 = 29.2 days). Model 2 introduces controls for industry experience.
Though industry experience appears important to entrepreneurial success – each year of
experience in the industry, for example, reduces the exit rate by roughly 6% – region tenure
continues to reduce exit rates significantly.7 A cursory examination of these coefficients
would suggest that industry experience matters much more than region experience, but note
6Our region fixed effects use the 79 mutually exclusive labor markets developed by Andersen (2000).
7In unreported models, the interaction of region tenure and industry experience did not significantly affect
failure rates or profits or cash flows, suggesting that they do not act as complements or substitutes.
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that region tenure varies more than industry experience. Hence, the changes in survival rates
associated with a one standard deviation change in these factors (5.8 years in the region and
3.5 years in industry), are more similar: an 8.5% lower exit rate for longer region tenure and
a 19% lower rate for greater industry experience (Model 3). These results remain robust to
controls for both demographics and financial resources.
In terms of the control variables, the results appear highly consistent with past research.
Male and married founders’ firms enjoy lower exit rates. Success appears to vary non-
monotonically with founder age, first rising and then declining; consistent with prior studies,
the probability of startup survival peaks for entrepreneurs of age 42. And the companies
started by those with higher levels of education survive longer.
Financial resources also increase survival rates. Here, note that though a unit of house-
hold wealth has nearly eight times the effect of that of parents’ wealth, parents’ wealth varies
by nearly seven times as much as household wealth. Our results therefore interestingly imply
that parents’ wealth, which has generally not been considered in prior research, appears as
important as the entrepreneur’s own wealth in determining their entrepreneurial success.
Despite the consistency of our estimates, one might worry that the effects of region
tenure flow not from the connections themselves but from region-specific economic shocks
that influence both performance and entrepreneurs’ decisions of whether to remain in a
region. Model 4 addresses this issue by introducing region-year fixed effects. In essence, we
compare the performance of startups within the same region in the same year on the basis
of the characteristics of their founders. Though these fixed effects are jointly significant,
they have no meaningful effect on any of the other coefficients. It therefore appears that
region-specific shocks cannot account for our results.
Finally, Model 5 introduces region-industry fixed effects. This specification assesses, to
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some extent, how much of the region tenure effect stems from the better ability of these
entrepreneurs to choose good businesses for their region (opportunity identification). Al-
though the inclusion of these fixed effects dampens the effect sizes somewhat, even within
the same industry and region, those entrepreneurs with deeper historical connections to the
region appear to perform better. We would also note that these industry-region fixed effects
themselves are not jointly significant (p = .48); cross-regional performance differences within
industry appear limited, at least in terms of survival.
Estimates by sector and population density: Another interesting issue is whether
the value of regional experience might vary by the industry or region being entered. For
example, relationships could play a role both in factor markets and in facilitating sales. One
might therefore expect higher returns to regional experience in sectors, such as services,
where relationships play an important role in both.
Table 4 reports the results of estimating Model 3 within three different sectors of the
economy – traditional manufacturing, modern manufacturing and services – and across re-
gions with above- and below-average population.8 Interestingly, regional tenure appears to
matter more in traditional manufacturing than in services (t = 2.23; p ≤ .05) or in modern
manufacturing (t = 1.63; p ≤ .10). Entry into traditional manufacturing may require more
financial capital and/or harder-to-recruit employees. Regional tenure also has larger benefits
in less-populated regions than in more-populated ones (t = 2.77; p ≤ .01), consistent with
the idea that these places have more tightly-weaved social fabrics.
8Modern manufacturing groups a variety of businesses that one might broadly classify as high tech,
such as biotechnology, computer hardware and software, and telecommunications (N = 1, 177). Traditional
manufacturing, meanwhile, comprises all other manufacturing firms and construction (N = 2, 782). Service
firms, meanwhile, include cleaners, clubs and stores, as well as accounting and consulting firms (N = 9, 209).
15
2.3 Annual profits
Though our results appear consistent with the idea that entrepreneurs benefit from experi-
ence in a region, exit can mean many things. It might reflect the failure of the business idea.
But it might also stem from the availability of a more attractive outside option, for example,
as an employee in another firm (Gimeno et al. 1997). Since these outside opportunities might
also differ across individuals, we explored the effects of entrepreneur characteristics on an
alternative measure of performance: annual profits. As in the exit rate models, we included
fixed effects to control for differences in profitability as a function of firm age, of the business
cycle (entry year), and of the region.9
Table 5 reports the results of these models. Here, positive values indicate factors asso-
ciated with success. Beginning with the first column (Model 11), the estimates imply that
each additional year of region tenure corresponds to roughly $1,362 more in profits in each
year of operation. By comparison, each year of experience in the industry – or surprisingly
even in a related one – predicts an increase of roughly $1,603 of additional annual profits
(Model 12). Hence, a one standard deviation increase in region tenure would predict $7,913
greater profits each year while a similar increase in industry experience would only imply a
$5,546 increase in annual profits. These results remain robust to the inclusion of our various
demographic controls. Interestingly, with the exception of prior wages, none of the controls
have consistent, significant effects on profitability, and they unexpectedly have a negative
effect: Those that earned more as employees appear to earn lower profits.
The table also reports a series of robustness checks, beginning in the fourth column
(Model 14). First, we replaced profits with total cash flow to the founder – profits plus
9To accommodate potential correlation in the error structure across repeated observations of the same
firm, we report robust standard errors, clustered at the firm level (Arellano 1987).
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dividends and wages – as the dependent variable.10 Entrepreneur-owned companies differ
from others in that the entrepreneur can choose whether to accrue economic profits as ac-
counting profits or to extract them as salary (Hamilton 2000). Here, we see something of
a resolution to the wage effect above. Overall, the results, however, remain robust to this
alternate dependent variable. In fact, only two variables appear to differ significantly across
these outcomes: Male founders and those with college educations extract more from their
startups in the form of salary.11
Model 15, then, introduces region-year fixed effects to account for region-specific economic
shocks. As in the exit rate models, these fixed effects have no meaningful influence on the
estimates of the effects of the other covariates. Model 16, meanwhile, reports the results
of estimates with region-industry fixed effects. Whereas these fixed effects explained little
in terms of variation in survival, they are more important in predicting annual profits: the
choice of region-industry appears to account for more than one-third of the advantages
associated with region tenure and with industry experience.
2.4 Instrumental variable estimates
Despite their consistency, our results may nonetheless overestimate the benefits of embed-
dedness. Notably, the decision to locate in a region could depend on the quality of one’s
contacts there. To address this issue, we attempted to look for variation in region tenure that
stemmed from a factor unrelated to the expected effect of this tenure on firm performance,
10One might also consider including capital gains for those businesses sold. But, in theory, these capital
gains should largely reflect the cumulative retained earnings; including capital gains in the cash flows would
therefore effectively double-count these profits (for businesses exited through a sale). In unreported analyses,
we nevertheless analyzed these capital gains separately for those businesses that exited and again found a
positive and significant relationship between region tenure and capital gains.
11We have run a complete set of models using this alternate dependent variable. Because the results only
differ significantly from the profits models on these two variables, we nevertheless have chosen not to report
them all in the paper.
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something akin to a quasi-experimental design. Specifically, we used the amount of time
that entrepreneurs’ parents lived in the regions in which they started their ventures as an
instrument for entrepreneurs’ region tenures.
Parents’ time in a region should influence the entrepreneur’s region tenure for at least
two reasons. Most directly, during their childhoods, individuals generally had little choice
but to live where their parents did. But even after becoming adults, individuals exhibit
strong preferences for living near their parents and therefore their parents’ location(s) should
influence their own decisions regarding where to live (Dahl and Sorenson 2010). Indeed,
(entrepreneur) region tenure and parent region tenure have a bivariate correlation of 0.51.
We nevertheless see little reason to expect parents’ time in region to affect the performance
of their children’s ventures, other than through their children’s regional embeddedness.12
Two complications arose in estimating the failure rate models with an instrumental vari-
able (IV). First, though development has begun on the use of instrumental variables in a
hazard rate context (Bijwaard 2008), understanding of these methods remains limited. Sec-
ond, pooling multiple years of data on each firm in a probit could lead to biased estimates.
We therefore estimated IV probit models of whether or not each firm survived beyond a
four-year threshold.13
In general, one worries about two issues in IV regression (see, for example, Murray 2006).
First, is the instrument exogenous? Although one cannot statistically test the exogeneity
of a single instrument (because the model is exactly identified), Model 17 first reports a
reduced form probit model of exit including both the instrument, parent region tenure, and
12Though one might worry that entrepreneurs leverage their parents contacts, less than five percent of
entrepreneurs opened businesses in a four-digit industry in which a parent had experience.
13We selected four years as the threshold because it represents the half-life in this sample and therefore
provides the maximum statistical power. Robustness checks with thresholds from two years to six years
nevertheless produced qualitatively equivalent results.
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the instrumented variable, (founder) region tenure, as covariates. Though not a formal test
of exogeneity, the results suggest that parent tenure has no direct effect on performance
(survival), controlling for region tenure, thereby lending some confidence to the assumption
that we can exclude it in the structural model.14
Second, is the instrument weak? The left columns for models 18 and 19 report the first-
stage estimates for the IV models. Parent region tenure strongly predicts (founder) region
tenure; the F -tests for the excluded instrument are 7,128 for the exit rate model and 18,665
for the annual profit and cash flow models (which have identical first stages).15 These values
far, far exceed the critical threshold of 16.4 reported by Stock and Yogo (2005) to ensure
that the 2SLS estimates have no more than 10% of the bias of the OLS estimates.
In the second stages, the effect of region tenure estimated off of this exogenous source
of variation in location choice remains significant and negative in the exit model. Founders
who have lived in the region longer have a higher probability of seeing their ventures survive
for at least four years (model 18). The story for profits and cash flows (models 19 and 20),
however, seems a little less clear: though still positive, the second-stage estimates for profits
and cash flows, become insignificant. But consider the 95% confidence intervals for the OLS
(Models 13 and 14) versus the IV estimates (Models 19 and 20): One year of region tenure
corresponds to a $414 to $2,139 ($147 to $1,965) increase in annual profits (cash flows) in
the OLS models but the estimated effect ranges from -$578 to $1,823 (-$364 to $2,022) in
the IV models. Though the confidence intervals for the IV estimates include zero, no effect,
they also overlap almost the entire range of the confidence intervals for the OLS estimates,
14Parallel models for annual profits and cash flows also show no direct effect of the instrument on firm
performance. For profits, parent region tenure had a direct effect of -1.881 (t = −1.39) while for cash flows
it had a direct effect of -0.655 (t = −0.46).
15These values might seem surprisingly large. But one can easily verify them since the F -test for a single
instrument is equal to the square of the t-test for the coefficient for the excluded instrument in the first stage
(Wooldridge 2006, p.157). For example, (.368/.004)2 ≈ 7128 (Model 18).
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meaning that we can reject neither the possibility that the IV points to no effect nor the
possibility that the OLS and IV produce equivalent results. We can, however, conclude with
confidence that those who have lived longer in the region earn no less each year than their
more-recently-arrived peers and, since their businesses survive longer, that their ventures
earn more over time.
Though our results are robust to a wide variety of specifications, including region-year
and region-industry fixed effects and estimation with an instrumental variable to account for
the possible endogeneity of location choice, one might nonetheless worry that the decision
to become an entrepreneur itself may depend on region and therefore may influence our re-
sults. Though the region-industry fixed effects largely address this concern, we also explored
this possibility by estimating whether rates of entrepreneurship differ across regions. Inter-
estingly, once one accounts for compositional differences in human capital across regions,
regions do not differ significantly in the likelihood that a person residing in one of them
becomes an entrepreneur. It therefore appears unlikely that endogeneity in the decision to
become an entrepreneur biases our estimates of the value of region tenure.
3 Discussion
Entrepreneurs exhibit a great deal of geographic inertia in terms of choosing locations for
their new ventures—that is, they tend to open their businesses in the regions in which they
were born or where they have lived for a long time (Michelacci and Silva 2007; Dahl and
Sorenson 2009). If these location choices stem from entrepreneurs’ better understanding of
these regions or from their deeper social capital within them, then entrepreneurs’ ventures
may benefit from this geographic inertia. But if they instead reflect the entrepreneurs’
desire to remain close to family and friends, these decisions may come at the expense of the
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financial performance of their ventures. Yet, little research has considered the consequences
of these choices for entrepreneurs.16 Here, we examined the performance of startups across
the entire range of the Danish economy and found that entrepreneurs benefit from regional
embeddedness: their ventures survive longer and earn more in annual profits and cash flows
when they found firms in the regions in which they have lived for a long time.
Regional embeddedness might contribute to entrepreneurial success through a number of
paths—helping entrepreneurs to identify promising opportunities, to assemble the resources
necessary to exploit those opportunities, or to sell goods and services. Our results neverthe-
less appear most consistent with the second of these possible paths. If entrepreneurs’ time in
their regions improved their ability to select the right industries to fit the region, then much
of the effect should disappear when we compare entrepreneurs within the same industries and
regions, but the effect not only persists but also remains more or less similar in magnitude
even within these groups. And if entrepreneurs’ tenure in their regions improved their ability
to sell goods, then we would expect to see stronger effects in industries where relationships
matter more to selling (e.g., business services). But we actually observe stronger effects in
manufacturing. We therefore suspect that having deep roots in the region matters most for
raising the capital and recruiting the personnel necessary to start these ventures.
From the point of view of the literature on entrepreneurship, our results offer a strong
complement to the research on spinoffs. Numerous studies have demonstrated that en-
trepreneurs with prior experience in an industry survive longer and grow faster (Agarwal
et al. 2004; Klepper and Sleeper 2005). Prior exposure to the region has a similar effect,
improving the performance of those organizations whose founders have it. Here, the issue is
16In a rare exception, Berchicci et al. (2011) examined the performance of spinoffs in the hard disk drive
industry and found that those that located near their parents did not differ significantly in sales growth from
those that moved. But their sample of 45 companies may not have had sufficient power to identify an effect.
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not human capital, which entrepreneurs can carry with them to other locations, but social
capital, which they cannot (for a possible exception, see Kalnins and Chung 2006). Interest-
ingly, these effects appear additive and similar in magnitude. Those most likely to succeed
therefore have prior exposure to both the industry and the region.
That fact raises interesting implications for the understanding of agglomeration. In
general, the literature on agglomeration has assumed that firms must cluster to benefit
from co-location. Our results, however, suggest that rational entrepreneurs would enter
the industries in which they have employment experience and locate their businesses in the
regions in which they have lived. Since acquiring experience at some existing firm in the
industry generally implies living in close proximity to it, the implication of these constraints
is that entrants in an industry will disproportionately emerge in regions that already have
dense populations of firms in the same industry even if co-location itself offers no advantages
(Sorenson and Audia 2000).
How then do industries disperse? On the one hand, existing firms opening new plants
do not face the same constraints as entrepreneurs, and therefore may contribute critically to
the seeding of new locations. On the other hand, despite the constraints that entrepreneurs
face, some individuals might have the ability to escape them. Those who have moved for
employment might find themselves in positions where they understand the industry and
have the relevant human capital to start a firm in it, and yet have not been away from
their prior homes long enough to lose their social capital there. These “geographic boundary
spanners” seem interesting both in themselves and in their implications for the evolution
of industries. As individuals, these people, with one foot in an industry and another in a
region not currently home to any industry incumbents, may represent the most promising
entrepreneurs. They can potentially access both human and social capital without falling
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prey to the hazards of intense local competition. At the industry level, they may play
particularly important roles in determining whether, when and how fast industries diffuse
from their places of origin.
References
Agarwal, Rajshree, Raj Echambadi, April M. Franco, M.B. Sarkar. 2004. Knowledge trans-
fer through inheritance: Spin-out generation, development, and survival. Academy of
Management Journal 47(4) 501–522.
Amit, Raphael, Lawrence Glosten, Eitan Muller. 1990. Entrepreneurial ability, venture
investments, and risk sharing. Management Science 36(10) 1232–1245.
Andersen, Anne Kaag. 2000. Commuting Areas in Denmark . AKF Forlaget, Copenhagen.
Arellano, Manuel. 1987. Computing robust standard errors for within-groups estimators.
Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics 49(4) 431–434.
Benz, M., Bruno S. Frey. 2008. The value of doing what you like: Evidence from the
self-employed in 23 countries. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 68(3-4)
445–455.
Berchicci, Luca, Andrew King, Christopher L. Tucci. 2011. Does the apple always fall close
to the tree? The geographical proximity choice of spinouts. Strategic Entrepreneurship
Journal 5(2) 120–136.
Bijwaard, Govert E. 2008. Instrumental variable estimation for duration data. Tinbergen
Institute Discussion Paper.
Blanchflower, David G., A.J. Oswald. 1998. What makes an entrepreneur? Journal of Labor
Economics 16(1) 26–60.
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Table 1: Most common entrepreneurial ventures, 1995-2004
Rank Industry Number Mean region tenure
1. Hotels and restaurants (55) 2,831 5.4
2. Retail trade (except of motor vehicles and motorcycles) (52) 2,522 6.0
3. Business consultancy (accounting, legal, management,
marketing, architectural etc.) (74) 2,404 6.7
4. Construction (45) 2,220 8.1
5. IT services, software and consultancy (72) 1,060 5.4
6. Land transportation (60) 487 8.3
7. Sale and maintenance of motor vehicles (50) 393 6.2
8. Manufacture of metals (28) 207 7.6
9. Manufacture of food products and beverages (15) 178 4.2
10. Real estate activities (70) 114 5.7
11. Publishing and printing (22) 104 5.2
12. Renting of automobiles (71) 88 6.7
13. Manufacture of machinery (29) 85 7.3
14. Manufacture of furniture (36) 61 5.4
15. Travel agency, cargo handling and storage (63) 59 5.9
16. Manufacture of electrical machinery and apparatus (31) 46 5.8
17. Research and development (73) 44 3.4
18. Post, courier and telecommunications (64) 30 6.0
19. Manufacture of wood (20) 29 4.5
20. Manufacture of medical, precision and optical instruments (33) 27 5.3
2-digit NACE SIC in parenthesis.
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics
Variable Mean SD Min. Max.
Exit 0.21 0.41 0 1
Exit (Year 4) 0.52 0.50 0 1
Profits (1,000 DKr) 127 1,009 -100,944 7,970
Cash flow (1,000 DKr) 472 1,076 -99,931 16,147
Region tenuret−1 (years) 6.39 5.81 0 14
Parent region tenuret−1 (years) 5.32 8.89 0 25
Industry exp (years) 2.02 3.46 0 15
Related industry exp (years) 1.43 2.82 0 15
Men 0.75 0.44 0 1
Married 0.49 0.5 0 1
Founder age 35.6 8.65 17 55
Gymnasium 0.52 0.50 0 1
College 0.23 0.42 0 1
Waget−1 (100,000 DKr) 2.62 2.73 0 69.5
Household wealtht−1 (100,000 DKr) 3.35 11.8 0 444
Parent wealtht−1 (100,000 DKr) 12.4 69.0 0 5,718
N 13,166
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Table 3: Piece-wise exponential estimates of exit rates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Region tenuret−1 0.983
∗∗ 0.985∗∗ 0.986∗∗ 0.986∗∗ 0.988∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Industry exp 0.942∗∗ 0.946∗∗ 0.946∗∗ 0.946∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Related ind exp 0.955∗∗ 0.961∗∗ 0.960∗∗ 0.960∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Men 0.880∗∗ 0.882∗∗ 0.914∗∗
(0.026) (0.027) (0.028)
Married 0.931∗∗ 0.934∗∗ 0.924∗∗
(0.025) (0.025) (0.026)
Founder age 0.954∗∗ 0.951∗∗ 0.958∗∗
(0.010) (0.010) (0.011)
Founder age2 (/100) 1.061∗∗ 1.064∗∗ 1.054∗∗
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
Gymnasium 0.815∗∗ 0.814∗∗ 0.824∗∗
(0.027) (0.027) (0.029)
College 0.706∗∗ 0.708∗∗ 0.732∗∗
(0.036) (0.036) (0.038)
Waget−1 0.990
∗ 0.990∗ 0.994
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Household wealtht−1 0.991
∗∗ 0.991∗∗ 0.992∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Parent wealtht−1 0.999
∗∗ 0.999∗ 0.999∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Constant 0.309∗∗ 0.352∗∗ 1.178 1.075 1.215
(0.048) (0.049) (0.185) (0.221) (0.241)
Firm age 12 pieces 12 pieces 12 pieces 12 pieces 12 pieces
Entry year 10 cohorts 10 cohorts 10 cohorts 10 cohorts 10 cohorts
Region 79 groups 79 groups 79 groups
Region-Year 948 groups
Region-Industry 943 groups
χ2 (d.f.) 408 (2) 340 (9) 1,838 (869) 862 (864)
N (firms) 13,166 13,166 13,166 13,166 13,166
N (firm-years) 50,041 50,041 50,041 50,041 50,041
Standard errors reported in parentheses.
Significance levels: † : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%
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Table 4: Piece-wise exponential estimates of exit rates by industry and density
(6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Traditional Modern Services Large Small
Manufacturing Manufacturing Cities Cities
Region tenuret−1 0.978
∗∗ 0.982∗ 0.988∗∗ 0.991∗∗ 0.981∗∗
(0.005) (0.009) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Industry exp 0.964∗∗ 0.969 0.934∗∗ 0.943∗∗ 0.948∗∗
(0.007) (0.029) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005)
Related ind exp 0.966∗∗ 0.973 0.959∗∗ 0.956∗∗ 0.965∗∗
(0.010) (0.023) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006)
Men 0.898 0.709∗ 0.910∗∗ 0.894∗∗ 0.862∗∗
(0.082) (0.151) (0.029) (0.040) (0.036)
Married 0.868∗ 0.962 0.929∗ 0.951 0.929∗
(0.061) (0.099) (0.029) (0.037) (0.034)
Founder age 0.948∗ 0.952 0.959∗∗ 0.944∗∗ 0.962∗∗
(0.026) (0.045) (0.012) (0.015) (0.014)
Founder age2 (/100) 1.070† 1.068 1.052∗∗ 1.074∗∗ 1.050∗
(0.035) (0.060) (0.016) (0.020) (0.019)
Gymnasium 0.784∗∗ 0.735∗ 0.831∗∗ 0.821∗∗ 0.814∗∗
(0.068) (0.135) (0.031) (0.041) (0.036)
College 0.741∗∗ 0.647∗∗ 0.720∗∗ 0.731∗∗ 0.668∗∗
(0.090) (0.139) (0.042) (0.050) (0.052)
Waget−1 0.995 1.024
∗ 0.980∗∗ 0.988† 0.994
(0.015) (0.012) (0.006) (0.006) (0.008)
Household wealtht−1 0.968
∗∗ 0.988∗ 0.944∗∗ 0.992∗∗ 0.990∗∗
(0.006) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Parent wealtht−1 0.995
∗∗ 1.001 0.999∗ 0.999∗ 0.999
(0.002) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Constant 1.346 1.240 1.083 1.368 1.041
(0.450) (0.836) (0.213) (0.267) (0.258)
Firm age 12 pieces 12 pieces 12 pieces 12 pieces 12 pieces
Entry year 10 cohorts 10 cohorts 10 cohorts 10 cohorts 10 cohorts
Region 79 groups 79 groups 79 groups 13 groups 66 groups
N (firms) 2,782 1,177 9,207 6,008 7,158
N (firm-years) 11,291 4,698 34,052 22,824 27,217
Standard errors reported in parentheses.
Significance levels: † : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%
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Table 5: OLS estimates of annual profits and cash flows (1,000 DKr)
(11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16)
Dependent variable Profits Profits Profits Cash flows Profits Profits
Region tenuret−1 7.490
∗∗ 7.065∗∗ 7.023∗∗ 5.809∗ 7.002∗∗ 4.612∗
(2.493) (2.517) (2.372) (2.500) (1.808) (1.831)
Industry exp 8.821∗ 9.646∗∗ 11.948∗∗ 9.650∗∗ 5.718∗
(3.715) (3.606) (3.739) (2.798) (2.911)
Related ind exp 6.178∗ 9.327∗ 9.099∗ 9.202∗∗ 4.713
(3.059) (3.725) (3.985) (3.418) (3.458)
Men 26.168 125.650∗∗ 26.220 32.880
(41.501) (42.260) (25.005) (25.759)
Married 8.463 34.806 6.524 2.368
(34.801) (35.550) (22.305) (22.092)
Founder age 10.492 31.050∗ 11.411 7.870
(12.430) (12.962) (9.940) (9.872)
Founder age2 (/100) -19.709 -43.757∗ -21.038 -14.711
(17.178) (17.759) (13.127) (13.045)
Gymnasium 5.346 27.903 4.066 6.183
(19.433) (21.919) (26.414) (26.596)
College -63.766 52.294 -64.896∗ 4.181
(40.140) (40.297) (31.471) (32.671)
Waget−1 -48.249
∗ -12.433 -48.522∗∗ -33.835∗∗
(20.827) (20.513) (3.793) (3.754)
Household wealtht−1 -0.024 2.513 -0.056 -1.006
(1.799) (2.093) (0.736) (0.755)
Parent wealtht−1 -0.187 0.084 -0.196 -0.276
†
(0.378) (0.414) (0.168) (0.163)
Constant 15.366 -11.436 -7.056 -262.637 312.559 -9.205
(47.575) (49.393) (196.978) (205.180) (228.862) (184.102)
Firm age 12 groups 12 groups 12 groups 12 groups 12 groups 12 groups
Entry year 10 cohorts 10 cohorts 10 cohorts 10 cohorts 10 cohorts 10 cohorts
Region 79 groups 79 groups 79 groups 79 groups
Region-Year 871 groups
Region-Industry 877 groups
N (firms) 12,301 12,301 12,301 12,296 12,301 12,301
N (firm-years) 45,355 45,355 45,355 45,103 45,355 45,355
Standard errors, clustered at the firm level, reported in parentheses.
Significance levels: † : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%
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Table 6: Instrumental variable estimates
(17) (18) (19) (20)
Probit IV Probit IV Reg IV Reg
Dependent variable Exit Region Exit Region Profits Cash flow
(Year 4) Tenure (Year 4) Tenure
Region tenuret−1 -0.012
∗∗ -0.018∗∗ 3.424 4.557
(0.002) (0.004) (3.302) (3.281)
Parent reg tenuret−1 -0.002 0.368
∗∗ 0.370∗∗
(0.002) (0.004) (0.003)
Industry exp -0.050∗∗ 0.055∗∗ -0.050∗∗ 0.049∗∗ 10.055∗∗ 12.090∗∗
(0.003) (0.013) (0.003) (0.006) (2.782) (2.763)
Related ind exp -0.039∗∗ 0.002 -0.039∗∗ -0.023∗∗ 9.370∗∗ 9.113∗∗
(0.004) (0.016) (0.004) (0.007) (3.376) (3.352)
Men -0.132∗∗ -0.166† -0.133∗∗ -0.224∗∗ 25.743 125.521∗∗
(0.027) (0.100) (0.027) (0.055) (24.679) (24.520)
Married -0.067∗∗ 0.494∗∗ -0.064∗∗ 0.562∗∗ 9.661 35.221
(0.024) (0.089) (0.024) (0.049) (22.047) (21.915)
Founder age -0.043∗∗ 0.014 -0.043∗∗ 0.033 10.560 31.070∗∗
(0.011) (0.038) (0.011) (0.022) (9.809) (9.764)
Founder age2 (/100) 0.051∗∗ 0.221∗∗ 0.052∗∗ 0.208∗∗ -19.368 -43.633∗∗
(0.014) (0.053) (0.014) (0.028) (12.957) (12.897)
Gymnasium -0.215∗∗ -0.089 -0.216∗∗ -0.140∗ 4.861 27.734
(0.028) (0.102) (0.028) (0.058) (26.074) (25.913)
College -0.370∗∗ -0.300∗ -0.372∗∗ -0.363∗∗ -66.481∗ 51.336†
(0.035) (0.129) (0.035) (0.069) (31.165) (30.988)
Waget−1 -0.009
∗ -0.053∗∗ -0.010∗ -0.076∗∗ -48.524∗∗ -12.528∗∗
(0.004) (0.019) (0.004) (0.008) (3.763) (3.741)
Household wealtht−1 -0.007
∗∗ -0.000 -0.007∗∗ -0.009∗∗ -0.040 2.508∗∗
(0.002) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002) (0.728) (0.725)
Parent wealtht−1 -0.001 -0.001
∗ -0.001 -0.002∗∗ -0.187 0.084
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.167) (0.166)
Constant 1.797∗∗ 1.158† 1.803∗∗ 0.947∗ 5.974 -258.079
(0.194) (0.666) (0.194) (0.405) (182.716) (181.897)
Instrument F-test 7,128.4 18,665
Critical value (r < 0.1) 16.4 16.4
Firm age 12 groups 12 groups
Entry year 10 cohorts 10 cohorts 10 cohorts 10 cohorts
Region 79 groups 79 groups 79 groups 79 groups
N (firms) 13,166 13,166 12,301 12,296
N (firm-years) 43,355 45,103
Standard errors reported in parentheses.
Significance levels: † : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%
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